TACKLING COMMUNAL RIOTS-HALAKANDI-1990

TACKLING COMMUNAL RIOTS: HAILAKANDI(ASSAM) OCT-NOV 1990

May 29 2008 | Views 1323 | Comments (10) | Report Abuse

Hailakandi district of Assam is part of the BARAK VALLEY separated from BRAHAMPUTRA VALLEY by KARBI ANGLONG HILLS and the Shillong Plateau. Barak Valley has its PORUS Western borders with Bangla Desh and it is the key region for the infiltration of ‘BANGLA DESHIS’ (BDs) into Assam and other states of North East. Barak Valley comprises four districts of Assam, namely, Hailakandi, Karimganj, North Cachhar and South Cachhar. The important town is Silchar in South Cachhar. This valley is a gateway to Mizoram and Tripura. The valley is overflowing with migrant BDs since 1947—earlier it were Hindu migrants and since 1970 it is the Muslim migrants. The demography of Barak valley has greatly turned in favour of BDs, both Hindu and Muslims. The unique thing of this demography is that Cities and towns are dominated by Hindus and rural areas by the Muslims. But unhindered infiltration of BDs has increased the Muslim population. Also, the covert support by Bangla Desh Government to ULFA and Paresh Barua, the self styled C-In-C of ULFA, has made the ULFA leadership take a soft view on BD migrants. This is what irked HITESHWAR SAIKIA about ULFA and its leadership. He accused them of damaging demography of Assam for selfish ends. Hailakandi district had its population in the same proportions---towns had 70 percent Hindus and villages had 70 percent Muslims---ethnically all Bengalis but hardly any ethnic Assamese anywhere.

During the third week of October 90, communal riots broke out in Hailakandi. This was as an after-math of ‘Ajodhya’ dispute. One evening, at 9 PM, on 28 October 90, while listening to the TV News (Doordarshan was the only channel, then) I heard that situation in Hailakandi was tense and the ‘army had been deployed’. This was strange as ours was the nearest unit and we were totally unaware of ‘our-so-called-deployment’. This is a very common phenomenon when the civil administration starts crying for army help at the first signs of any trouble. This is because the police and civil administration have become COMMITTED EXTENSIONS of various political parties. There is no exception to this. In the name of the supremacy of PEOPLEs REPRESENTATIVES they have made these wings of EXECUTIVE totally NON-EFFECTIVE. Now-a-days, even army is being threatened to be turned into a fiefdom of POLITICAL LOYALITIES by having committed Generals/Brigadiers. Those who do not toe the line are weeded out unheard, unsung and uncared because they have no political networks. During Kargil-99 episode, army generals went to brief the members of a political party

I rang up my Adjutant, Captain Raj Kumar (now Colonel), and asked him if we had received any such communication. His reply was negative. I immediately warned him to get ready to move and place the battalion on half an hour notice. Though nothing came through the night but I had my apprehension. Next morning all hell broke lose. We started getting frantic messages from Division Headquarters, located more than 60 kms away from us Masimpur (Silchar).

At about 0730 hours in the morning, Deputy General Officer Commanding of my DIVISION, Brigadier Pantal, came on the line and asked me as to how much time I needed to mobilize a company column. I said, “Half an hour”. He would not believe it. Any way, he said, “You can move by 1300 hours but if you can do it earlier it will be very good”. To say the least, the moment I had kept the telephone receiver down, my Adjutant had already asked Major Shamsher Singh(now Brigadier) to move his company column to Hailakandi-a distance of 90 kms from our location. Thus by 10, 00 hours the column had well-established itself in the Hailakandi district. The speed with which the column was positioned at Hailakandi stunned the Division Headquarters.
My men carried out a flag march in the town and the situation came under control. The sight of the army in full battle dress forced the potential trouble makers to develop cold feet. My officer, Major Shamsher, later briefed me on return that it was basically a problem created due to personal rift between the Deputy Commissioner (DC) and the Senior superintendent of Police (SSP)—both of them belonging to two separate communities. He cautioned me that it might take an ugly turn very shortly. And his assessment proved prophetic. As this was our area of operations for AID TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES, we were prepared to deal with the situation. We had identified potential trouble spots. And Hailakandi was high on our list because of the demographic imbalances.

In the second week of November 90, battalion was again asked to be deployed in Hailakandi. This time it was to be the whole battalion. It was a holiday and I must be asleep when the orders came. It was around 1500 hours when ear-splitting knocks at my door, followed by a loud and clear voice of my Adjutant, that I was shaken out of my slumber. He was screaming, “Get up, Colonel, we are moving." I came out and asked him as to what had happened. He was crisp, “It is Hailakandi again. Major MS Jakhar (retired as a colonel) and Major Shamsher Singh are already in Hailakandi with their respective company columns. I am moving the Battalion Headquarters. You may join us by evening. I am leaving your protection party behind. Situation out there seems to be very bad. We might need you.” I could see a triumphant grin on his face, almost knocking me down with my oft used pet-words, “You lazy, lethargic, stagnant minds. Stop poodle faking. Use your rusting brains”. Well, I knew I was clean bowled all ends up.

However, I decided to move immediately and by 1800 hours I was there at Hailakandi. By now, Major S S Sohi, my second-in-command, had already surveyed the whole town. He had the situation under control and he told me curtly, “Problem is not amongst the people. It is between superintendent of Police (SP) and the Deputy Commissioner (DC), one a Hindu and other a Muslim. They are blowing it out of proportions. You might like to hold a conference of civil officials and restrain them”. I said, “OK! Fix it for tomorrow morning 9 AM”. I learnt during the night that there were five companies of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and six to eight platoons of Assam Armed Police under the SSP. I wondered what was the need for the Army? I also learnt that Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of police in the Barak Valley, one Mr. Rao, was also camping in the town. I realized what was going on and decided to give a few lessons on administration to the civil officials. I told Sohi to ask DIG of Police, Mr. Rao, also to attend the conference. To my utter astonishment, DIG agreed.

In the conference next morning, in the full view of my officers and plethora of civil and police officials, with my blazing anger and whacking tongue, I began to fire the salvo thus:

“Gentlemen” I said, “We need to take a dispassionate view of the situation. Let us rise above our petty-mindedness and think in terms of national interests. I personally feel the kind of police force available here; there was no need to call the Army in”.

Mr. Abdul Malik, the Deputy Commissioner of Hailakandi, interjected, “No, sir, we have no confidence in police. They are taking sides”.

To this Mr. Raut, Superintendent of Police, angrily retorted, “No it is you who is taking sides. You are giving shelters to those criminals who initiated the riots”.

It was now clear to me that Police and Civil administration were definitely at logger heads due to separate religious affiliations.

I intervened, “Gentlemen, this is no way to handle the crisis. I am not here to sort out your personal problems. Do not see me in the role of a super-policemen and an administrator. I am here to assist you in maintaining law and order. You want my assistance you will have to prove it to me that you need me. Do not expect me and my men in the streets while you sleep in your bungalows and your police force goes on holidays. Deploy your police, send your Magistrates on the roads and then call for me. If you think, as Army has come, so your job was over, you all are very sadly mistaken. Army is not here to get involved in your intriguing games. Take control of the district and start administering it jointly or else I will march out the Army”.

Deputy Commissioner pleaded, “Please sir; there is a loss of confidence in the police. Please take over control of the district”.

I cut him short, “No way Army can take over administration. Law of the land does not permit. This needs amending the constitution. Do tell me when you have done it. We are leaving”.

This panicked them. DIG of Police, Mr. Rao requested me to stay on for two days. He agreed to deploy police in the sensitive areas if magistrates are provided with each picket and a stand-by Army column to provide assistance in case the situation goes out of control. This had been the problem. DC was not providing duty magistrates and police was not ready to deploy itself in the RURAL AREAS-dominated by Muslims. I asked DC to do it and asked Sohi to earmark one of our own columns as standby. I also ordered flag marches by the Army. By evening every thing was under control and Hailakandi town was incident free.

Next day I suggested to DC to lift the curfew which was done. Normalcy had returned within 24 hours. There were no cases of torching, arson and looting as had happened some 36 hours before. By third day, I pulled out most of the battalion to go back to my original location, Lailapur near Vairengte (MIZORAM). I had left behind a column of company plus under Major MS Jakhar to prevent any reversion to riots.

‘Operation Hailakandi’ gave me a good insight of the way civil administration functions and it came quiet handy during my conduct of ‘OP RHINO’ later. I also realized that the role of Army in such like situations was not of a ‘super-police-man’ but of deterrence, whose presence must evoke fear amongst trouble-makers and generate confidence amongst normal citizens. This became my cardinal principle for conducting future operations.